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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
the value of his secured claim. This was accomplished by granting a
remedy similar to that provided a junior lienor where both a senior and
junior mortgage are given by a mortgagor with legal title to the land. In
an area where both the remedies and the rationale of the decisions have
been muddled, Fincher provides an excellent solution.
THOMAS A. HENZLER
SECURITIES REGULATION-
IN PARI DELICTO AS A BAR TO
PRIVATE ANTIFRAUD ACTION
BY TIPPEE AGAINST TIPPER
Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank '
The defendant S. Robert Mialki, who was a friend and personal
banker of the plaintiff William Tarasi, informed him that two corpora-
tions, Meridian Industries and Paragon Plastics, were negotiating a
merger. Mialki told Tarasi, a relative newcomer to securities investment,
that the value of Meridian Industries common stock probably would
double and suggested that Tarasi invest. The information on the merger
was represented to be "hush-hush." In response to these disclosures,
Tarasi purchased 1,200 shares of Meridian at $8.25 per share without
revealing the information he had received from Mialki concerning the
merger. Two other eventual plaintiffs were introduced to Mialki by
Tarasi; both purchased stock upon similar representations. The merger
between Paragon and Meridian did not occur, and the value of Meridian
stock declined to about $1.00 per share. The three purchasers filed suit
against Mialki and Pittsburgh National Bank 2 and alleged violations of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 3 and rule 1Ob-5.'1
1. 555 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 504 (1977).
2. The bank's alleged liability was based upon the fraudulent misrepresen-
tations of its agent Mialki. Brief for Appellant at 17.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any se-
curity not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
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The defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted by the dis-
:rict court on the ground that the plaintiffs were in pari delicto (of equal
fault) by virtue of their failure to disclose, at the time of their purchase
of the Meridian shares, the secret information which they held. The
Third Circuit affirmed and held that the defense of in pari delicto barred
recovery by "tippees" injured as a result of their reliance on false, non-
public information received from a corporate insider (a "tipper").
The applicability of the defense of in pari delicto in securities actions
in general, and in tippee-tipper suits in particular, has engendered con-
siderable controversy. 5 The matter ultimately turns on a policy determi-
nation, and two conflicting viewpoints have emerged concerning the best
way to serve that policy. 6 Tarasi is significant because it considered both
of these viewpoints carefully 7 and opted for application of in pari delicto
as a matter of law.8 This conscious choice by the court consolidates the
position of the defense with respect to tippee-tipper suits under rule
lOb-5.
Rule 1 Ob-5, a general antifraud provision, was promulgated pur-
suant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 9 Al-
though neither the rule nor the statute expressly provide for a civil rem-
edy, such a remedy has been long recognized' ° and has developed to
the point where private civil suits constitute an important enforcement
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
5. This controversy has given rise to a great deal of critical commentary. See,
e.g., Bell, How to Bar an Uninnocent Investor-The Validity of Common Law Defenses
to Private Actions Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 1
(1970); Godfrey, Plaintiff's Conduct as a Bar to Recovery under the Securities Acts: In
Pari Delicto, 48 TEx. L. REv. 181 (1969); Schiebelhut, The Demise of In Pali Delicto
in Private Actions Pursuant to Regulatory Schemes, 60 CAL. L. REv. 572 (1972).
6. E.g., Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969) (applying
in pari delicto to the tip situation). Contra, Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon,
Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (prohibiting the application of the de-
fense).
7. 555 F.2d at 1159-61.
8. Id. at 1164.
9. See notes 3 & 4 supra.
10. The first case to establish this implied civil action was Kardon v. Nat'l
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). All of the circuits now recognize
the private action, in accordance with the broad statutory objective of protecting
investors from fraudulent practices. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1763-64
(1961, Supp. 1969). The U.S. Supreme Court implicitly approved the civil action
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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device under the statute." In furtherance of the remedial purposes of
a rule lOb-5 civil action, the courts have permitted extensive recoveries 12
and extended the scope of rule 1Ob-5 beyond traditional insiders to en-
compass anyone holding confidential, inside information.1 3  Persons
given inside information concerning corporate affairs are classified as
"tippees" 14 and have a duty either to disclose their information upon the
purchase or sale of securities or to refrain from trading.' 5 Con-
sequently, problems arise when a tippee, himself in violation of the rule
because of a failure to disclose, attempts to recover for losses incurred by
his reliance on a fraudulent tip.
The common law defense of in pai delicto has found application in
this tippee-tipper context. As the rule generally is applied, if the parties
to a lawsuit are in pari delicto, the court will aid neither party, and leave
the loss where it falls. 6 However, the doctrine has had its limitations.
Traditionally, in pari delicto has been applied in the interest of society
and not in the interests of the individual litigants. Courts have refused to
allow the interposition of the defense when the defendant's misconduct
exceeds that of the plaintiff, or when the defense works a greater injus-
11. Although rule lob-5 was used rarely in its early years, it is now the basis
for approximately one-third of all cases, public and private, brought under the
federal securities laws and generates almost as much litigation as all the other
antifraud provisions combined. A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC
RULE lOb-5 § 2.5(6) (1967). The practical effect of this civil action is to provide a
significant supplement to the criminal prosecution provisions of the securities
laws. Godfrey, supra note 5 at 181.
12. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969), demonstrates the tendency to provide extensive recovery.
Note also that the judicial imposition of civil liability under the rule has elimi-
nated the necessity of proving the required elements of common law fraud. E.g.,
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 831 (D. Del. 1951). See also
Posner, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation, 22 Bus. LAw. 645, 654 (1967).
The common law elements of fraud are: (1) a false representation, (2) of a mate-
rial fact, (3) made with knowledge of its falsity, and (4) with intent to deceive, (5)
which representation is relied upon by plaintiff, (6) resulting in damage to him.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 100, 104 at 700, 736 (3d ed.
1964).
13. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
14. A "tippee" has been defined as a person given information by an insider
in breach of trust. Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
15. A. BROMBERG, supra note 11, § 7.4(6)(a); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). If a tippee
fails to disclose the inside information when purchasing or selling securities, he
can be held liable to the injured seller or buyer.
16. J. POMEROY, 3 EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 940-941 (5th ed. 1941). The
defense has been accepted under federal law. See, e.g., Precision Instr. Mfg. Co.
v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
A companion principle is the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands" under
which a party is unable to obtain equitable relief if he himself has engaged in
misconduct in the transaction at issue. This doctrine is inapplicable in Tarasi be-
cause the plaintiff sought only monetary damages.
380 [Vol. 43
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tice to the public interest than would permitting a recovery.' 7 Because
the application of in pari delicto hinges upon what best serves the public
interest, courts have viewed the defense unfavorably when a plaintiff
asserts a right to recovery based upon remedial legislation. In these areas
of the law, public policy encourages private actions as enforcement de-
vices for a public interest, even though a windfall may accrue to a
wrongdoing plaintiff.
The leading case illustrating this view is Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp.,' 8 in which the Supreme Court explained:
We have often indicated the inappropriateness of invoking
broad common-law barriers to relief where a private suit serves
important public purposes.... [T]he antitrust laws are best
served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-pres-
ent threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in
violation of the antitrust laws. The plaintiff who reaps the re-
ward of treble damages may be no less morally reprehensible
than the defendant, but the law encourages his suit to further
the overriding public policy in favor of competition. A more
fastidious regard for the relative moral worth of the parties
would only result in seriously undermining the usefulness of
the private action as a bulwark of antitrust enforcement. 19
The mandate of Perma Life in antitrust actions would appear equally
applicable to securities regulation suits. A major policy consideration in
both the antitrust and securities areas has been the encouragement of
private actions by facilitating recoveries.
In the past, the defense of in pari delicto has been applied sporadi-
cally in securities actions. 20 However, in the tippee-tipper situation the
defense has been invoked increasingly to bar a plaintiff tippee's recovery
against a tipper. The question how best to fulfill the overall policy of
securities regulation becomes acutely difficult to resolve in this particular
situation. The policy of encouraging private actions by disallowing the
defense conflicts with the concern for deterring the tippee's own viola-
tion by barring his recovery. In dealing with this conflict, the federal
courts have formulated the following test to determine the applicability
of the defense: whether the unlawful conduct of the plaintiff is of suffi-
cient magnitude, compared to defendant's derelictions, to establish the
foundation for in pari delicto; and, if so, whether the policies and public
interest underlying the securities laws, and specifically rule lOb-5, would
17. 3 J. POMEROY, supra note 16, § 941. However, the application of the de-
fense often has led to confusion and inconsistency; its general relevance in mod-
em judicial procedure is in dispute. See Chafee, Coming into Equity with Clean
Hands, 47 MICH. L. REV. 877, 878 (1949); Comment, Rule 10b-5: The In Pari
Delicto and Unclean Hands Defenses, 58 CAL. L. REv. 1149, 1162-67 (1970).
18. 392 U.S. 134 (1968). See Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in
Private Antitrust Suits, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1241 (1965).
19. 392 U.S. at 138-39.
20. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 955-56 (2d ed. 1961).
19781
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best be served by application of the defense.21 The Tarasi court worked
within this commonly accepted framework and determined the propriety
of in pari delicto by applying the test to the facts before it.22
The court's examination first centered upon the relative magnitude
of the fault of the plaintiff tippees. The court found two lOb-5 violations
by the defendant tipper: the fraudulent statements upon which the tip-
pees relied, and the selective release of inside informationA. 3 The con-
duct of the plaintiffs was measured against this latter violation. The
court pointed out that the plaintiffs' conduct in purchasing securities
without disclosing their secret information was wholly voluntary.2 4
Based upon this voluntary conduct, it determined that the tippees were
joint participants in wrongdoing with the defendant. It further em-
phasized that this voluntary conduct was the sine qua non of their in-
juries.2 5 Thus, the court concluded that the conduct of the tippees was
of sufficient magnitude and had a sufficient causal relation to their
losses to establish the foundation for the application of in pari delicto.
There are several problems in this reasoning. In assessing the ap-
plicability of in pari delicto to securities suits, the federal courts gener-
ally have required that the plaintiff be an active and joint participant in
the defendant's wrongdoing. 6 This standard has been refined to com-
port better with Perma Life; it requires that the plaintiff's fault be
"mutual, simultaneous and relatively equal" to that of the defendant.2 7
In Tarasi the court admitted that the parties never had agreed upon or
even contemplated a joint or mutual program of illegal conduct. 28 It
thus appears doubtful whether the standard for the application of in pari
21. See, e.g., Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1975);
Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969); Nathanson v. Weis,
Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See generally Annot., 26
A.L.R. Fed. 682 (1976).
22. 555 F.2d at 1161-62.
23. Id. at 1161.
24. Id. at 1162. The court attempted to distinguish this voluntary conduct
from the passive "coerced" conduct in which the plaintiffs in Perma Life were said
to have engaged.
25. Id.
26. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1013 (2d Cir. 1970) (disallowing in pari delicto, and distinguishing earlier se-
curities cases applying the defense by suggesting that it was applicable only when
plaintiff participates in the initiation of the defendant's violation of which he is
complaining); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (in pari delicto applied where plaintiff initiated the violations, misleading
defendant into making a loan in violation of securities laws).
27. James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155, 160 (5th Cir. 1974). In James v. Du-
Breuil the plaintiff and the defendant conspired together to defraud others. To
further this mutual purpose, the plaintiff backdated a document to avoid se-
curities laws. To some extent, James v. DuBreuil may be construed as implicitly
cutting back on the Fifth Circuit's earlier decision in Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.
28. 555 F.2d at 1162.
[Vol. 43
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delicto was met. It also is arguable that the tippees were less reprehensi-
ble than the tipper because they were duped by the insider defendant.
The information on which the plaintiffs acted was false, and because the
anticipated merger did not occur, their purchase of securities did not
harm the sellers. One also must question whether the court was correct
in measuring the plaintiffs' transgressions against the defendant's sup-
posed tipping violation, instead of against the defendant's fraudulent
statements which were the basis of the plaintiffs' claims.
Assuming that the plaintiffs' fault did establish the foundation for in
pari delicto, the ultimate determinant is whether the defense can be har-
monized with the policy and public interest underlying rule lOb-5. 2 9
The court in Tarasi discussed and weighed the conflicting policies. It
expressly recognized that disallowing the defense and subjecting the tip-
per to liability for his misrepresentation would place pressure on the
source of the tip and deter the tipper from releasing information known
to be false. However, the court found this consideration outweighed by
the prophylactic effect of the in pari delicto defense on the tippees' use of
inside information and so concluded that the defense should apply as a
matter of law.3 0
It is questionable whether this decision in fact best fulfills the overall
objectives of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5. The
principal intent behind rule 1Ob-5 and the civil action implied thereun-
der was to protect investors. Section 10(b) of the Act expressly delineates
this intention.3 ' As the means to secure investor protection, the courts
have looked to the implied civil action and its dual purpose-deterring
violations and compensating injured investors. 32
The deterrence of violations will be most effectively accomplished by
placing either liability or the burden of loss or both where they will exert
the maximum deterrent force. Concededly, a tippee who realizes that he
may lose his investment by fraud and be deprived of legal recourse by in
pari delicto would be deterred from trading on the basis of a secret tip.
29. The court in Tarasi noted that even if in pari delicto would appear techni-
cally applicable (i.e., equal fault truly existed), it cannot be used as a bar to
"thwart recovery in private actions under regulatory statutes." The defense's im-
pact on statutory schemes must be assessed. 555 F.2d at 1158-59. Accord, Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. at 139. Securities cases
have found Perma Life's approach of basing recovery upon enforcement consid-
erations applicable even in the true "equal fault" situation. See Kuehnert v.
Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704, 705 (5th Cir. 1969) (majority opinion and
dissent).
30. 555 F.2d at 1164.
31. See note 3 supra.
32. See the discussions of the dual policies of deterrence of violati6ns and
compensation of injured investors in Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591
(5th Cir. 1975); Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-JOB-5: An Emerging Remedy for
Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1156 (1950); Ruder, Multiple Defendants in
Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding & Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Identifica-
tion, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 660-62 (1972).
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To the extent that the tippee is encouraged to trade only after full dis-
closure of all material information, the Tarasi application of in pari delicto
fulfills an objective of rule 10b-5. As a practical matter, the deterrent
effect on the tippee may not be significant. As in Tarasi, the tippee is
typically an "odd-lot" buyer or seller, 33 unsophisticated in securities
dealings and acting on a spur-of-the-moment "hot tip." It is unrealistic to
believe that the prospective unavailability of legal remedies would inhibit
such a person from acting on confidential information passed down by a
high corporate executive. The unsophisticated tippee may not even be
aware that a duty to disclose exists; hence there may be no deterrent
effect whatsoever on his use of the tip.
Furthermore, because scienter is a required element of a cause of
action under rule lOb-5, 34 a tippee does not have a submissible case ab-
sent a showing that the tipper knowingly and intentionally passed on a
false tip. The tippee is not given a "warranty of accuracy" on the tip he
receives.3 5 Rather, the scienter requirement bars legal recourse by the
tippee against the tipper in all instances except when the falsity is inten-
tional. Thus, even assuming the tippee to be sophisticated regarding
securities matters, he already would be substantially deterred from
trading on a tip without making full disclosure of its substance. The only
additional deterrence wrought by the application of in pari delicto as a bar
to the tippee's recovery would stem from his fear of intentional deceit.
This added deterrence would be minimal because the tipping situation
often involves a confidential relationship between the parties, as was the
case in Tarasi.36  In such a confidential situation, it is unreasonable to
believe that a tippee would seriously suspect that the tipper would de-
ceive him intentionally.
On the other hand, disallowing the interposition of in pari delicto
would substantially deter fraudulent tipping by the tipper.3 7 The appli-
33. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 706 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold,
J., dissenting).
34. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
35. The court in Tarasi was concerned that permitting a tippee to recover
would give him a virtual "warranty of accuracy" on such tips, and that there
would be "no incentive to forbear from using inside information." 555 F.2d at
1163. This stance adopts the analysis developed in Note, Securities Regulation:
Doctrines of In Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands Held to Bar 1OB-5 Recovery by Tippee
Against Corporate Insider, 1969 DuKE L.J. 832, 839-40 (1969) (noting Kuehnert v.
Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969)). The Tarasi court repeatedly cited
this article. 555 F.2d at 1158 n.23, 1163 n.55, 1164 n.57. However, it should be
noted that in light of Ernst & Ernst, this analysis has become far less persuasive.
The requirement of scienter erodes any broad "warranty of accuracy." The tip-
pee is only warranted against knowing and intentional deceit.
36. Mialki was both a friend and the personal banker of Tarasi. 555 F.2d at
1154. In such circumstances, it seems doubtful that Tarasi would seriously fear
that Mialki was intentionally perpetrating a fraud.
37. The court in Tarasi largely chose to ignore this factor, noting simply that
the deterrent effect on the release of "true" tips would be minimal. 555 F.2d at
[Vol.. 43384
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cation of every possible discouragement to the disseminator of false in-
formation seems more efficient than punishing (by denial of recovery)
only the person to whom the information is communicated. The tipper,
normally a relatively sophisticated entrepreneur or corporate insider (as
in Tarasi), presumably is aware of the ban on certain conduct and the
possibility of recovery by the tippee. At the fountainhead, the tipper has
the greater potential for harm; 38 one tipper may relate the false inside
information to a number of tippees. Therefore, permitting tippee recov-
ery would achieve the maximum deterrent effect in the tippee-tipper
situation, for it not only strikes at the source of the violation,39 but also
places liability on the party more likely to be deterred.
Investor protection also is furthered by the implied civil action
under rule 10b-5 through the compensation of injured investors. The
relief provided in private suits warns the transgressor that his conduct is
proscribed and recompenses the party injured by a particular transac-
tion. The plaintiffs in Tarasi were certainly "investors" by virtue of their
purchases of securities. Contrary to the purpose of rule lOb-5, they were
denied compensation. The plaintiffs were not "innocent investors"; 40
however, almost no amount of gullibility, insufficient diligence, or blind-
ness to what is going on has ordinarily disqualified a plaintiff from pro-
ceeding under rule 10b-5.41 Nor have investors lost the protection of
securities legislation by becoming involved to some extent in the illegality
of a securities sale.42
The decision in Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank departs from the
liberal trend towards facilitating investor recovery. 43  The court
ultimately protected the insider rather than the investor. In effect the
corporate insider was told that if he releases false information which
induces action on the part of one or more tippees, he need not fear
1163. This approach fails to emphasize properly an important consideration. A
major objective of the securities laws and particularly rule 10b-5 has been to
protect against the inequities flowing from trading stimulated by false informa-
tion. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858-59 (2d Cir. 1968), citing
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
38. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 442 F.2d 700, 706 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold,
J., dissenting); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
39. This argument was recognized by the court in Tarasi as deserving of
some merit. 555 F.2d at 1163.
40. Royal Air Properties v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1962) (the
purpose of the Act was to protect the "innocent investor," not the one who waits
to see how his investment turns out before invoking the provisions of the Act).
41. Comment, supra note 17, at 1154. E.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d
260 (1st Cir. 1966); Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596, 602 (7th Cir.
1965), rev'd on other grounds, 383 U.S. 363 (1966) ("[T]he policy of the federal
securities laws is to protect investors, including the uninformed, the ignorant,
and the gullible.").
42. Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1964).
43. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
1978] 385
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private enforcement of the securities laws. This result appears especially
anomalous in light of the overall aims of rule 10b-5. The rule expressly
proscribes "untrue statements" in connection with securities transactions.
Its promulgation added to the existing body of securities law some pro-
tection for the investor against a third party to a securities transac-
tion. 44 However, Tarasi insulates this third party from liability for a
fraudulent statement, and leaves the investor who is injured by that mis-
representation uncompensated.
The Tarasi holding also runs counter to the public interest in en-
couraging private suits under rule lOb-5. 45  The resources of the Se-
curities Exchange Commission are adequate to prosecute only the most
flagrant abuses. Consequently, both the exposure of violations and en-
forcement of the rule's provisions depend largely upon the encourage-
ment of private suits.46 Applying in pari delicto denies the tippee the
opportunity to recoup his losses. The defense eliminates the incentive to
bring suit, with the result that many violations of the securities acts re-
main unexposed. Not only is the tippee unlikely to bring suit, he is de-
terred from even exposing the tipper's transgression. The tippee has
nothing to gain from such exposure, and drawing attention to the
fraudulent tip and subsequent transaction may expose himself to the
possibility of criminal or administrative sanctions for attempted fraud by
virtue of his failure to disclose.4 7
Conversely, disallowing in pari delicto and permitting the tippee to
recover would encourage exposure of violations. 48 The possibility of re-
covery would be an incentive for the tippee to expose the tipper's mis-
representation. The Securities Exchange Commission could monitor
such lawsuits with relative ease and could apply appropriate and consis-
44. Comment, note 32 supra, at 1138. This article points out that rule 10b-5
filled a gap in federal protection against securities fraud by giving to the seller orbuyer of securities a remedy against a person who makes a misrepresentation
inducing a transaction, where that person was not a party to the transaction.
45. Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953). "[N]othing ...
would tend more ... to deter fraudulent practices in security transactions ...
than the right of defrauded sellers or buyers ... to seek redress in damages in
federal courts." See also text accompanying notes 10-12 supra; Comment, supra
note 17, at 1155-58.
46. A. BROMBERG, supra note 11, §§ 10.1-10.3. See also Woolf v. S.D. Cohn &
Co., 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1975).
47. The possibility of criminal sanctions must be reckoned with, even though
the sanctions are infrequently applied. A. BROMBERG, supra note 11, §§ 10.1-10.3.
Sanctiong are provided for in § 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970). The maximum criminal penalty is two years imprison-
ment and/or a $10,000 fine. Few convictions have produced judicial opinions;
most have come on pleas of nolo contendere. See United States v. Shindler, 173 F.
Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding 10b-5 valid in a criminal context).
48. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 706 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold,
J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 17, at 1157-58; Comment, Deterrence of Tip-
pee Trading Under Rule 10b-5, 38 U. Cal. L. Rv. 372, 376 (1971).
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